Using longitudinal data from the Swiss Household Panel, this analysis suggests that the cross-sectional estimates of the returns to educational mismatch are significantly biased when unobserved heterogeneity is omitted in the wage equation. The results of the standard fixed effects model indeed demonstrate that the wage returns to education are independent of the job requirements. Hence, this empirical analysis supports the human capital interpretation of the Swiss labour market.
Introduction
The analyses of educational mismatch in the labour market and its consequences on individual wages have never been so widespread than nowadays.
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Educational mismatch arises in the form of overeducation (i.e. workers have more education than is required for their jobs) or undereducation (i.e. workers have less education than is required for their jobs). Since the seminal paper by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) , who proposed an extension of the Mincer wage equation in order to estimate the returns to over/required/undereducation, the literature has generally agreed with the following two points. First, overeducated workers earn less than those adequately educated with the same education but more than those adequately educated in the same occupation. Second, undereducated workers earn more than those adequately educated with the same education but less than those adequately educated in the same occupation. Given the growing availability of panel data, some studies have applied the fixed effects estimation method to Duncan and Hoffman's wage equation (Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009 ). The main idea of this method is to account for unobserved heterogeneity whose omission may lead to biased estimates in cross-sectional analyses. However, neither Bauer nor Korpi and Tåhlin have considered the fact that fixed effects estimates of the returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation may not be properly identified since there is probably little or no variation in actual education over time. The aim of this paper is to address this problem of identification when using fixed effects to estimate the returns to educational mismatch.
How to reconcile the variation need of the fixed effects estimator and the time-invariant nature of actual education? Motivated by the latest metaanalyses of studies on educational mismatch, we rely on a simplified version of Duncan and Hoffman's model proposed by Rumberger (1987) in which years of overeducation and years of undereducation are restricted to have symmetric effects on wages. After rearranging Rumberger's specification, we show that the coefficient associated with required education is the differen-tial rate of return between required education and educational mismatch. Since required education is time-varying, the fixed effects method allows the identification of this coefficient. The fixed effects results based on panel data from Switzerland demonstrate that the wage returns to education are independent of the job requirements, i.e. the estimated differential rate of return is equal to zero. Hence, this empirical analysis supports the human capital interpretation of the Swiss labour market.
The next section of this paper provides a description of the data from the Swiss Household Panel Survey and explains how educational mismatch is measured. Section 3 presents the modelling approaches to estimating by fixed effects the returns to educational mismatch under the time-invariant nature of actual education. The regression results are produced in Section 4 and a number of robustness checks are performed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the significance of our findings and proposes possible extensions.
Data
We use the data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS). The SHP is an unbalanced panel where surveyed individuals may temporarily drop out of the sample because certain or all variables are unobserved for some time period. It consists of two samples: the SHP_I (the sample of households and individuals interviewed for the first time in 1999) and the SHP_II (a refreshment sample of "new" households included in 2004). The individual questionnaires cover a broad range of topics, of which education and employment are our main points of interest.
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In the empirical analysis, we restrict our final sample to individuals who belonged to the working age population (18-65 for men, 18-62 for women) of Swiss origin (i.e. with the Swiss citizenship and at least one parent that is/was Swiss by birth) at the time of the first-wave interview in 1999; in addition, we include workers who were not self-employed, not enrolled in education and reported valid information for the variables of interest (e.g. level of occupation, gross hourly earnings, potential work experience). We consider that, once a person drops out (because he/she does not reply to the questionnaire, moves out of the labour force, becomes self-employed, starts studying again or reports invalid information for the variables of interest), he/she is out forever. Hence, we ignore any subsequent observations on individuals after they leave the sample (dropout is an absorbing state). Given the relatively high attrition among selected individuals over time, we focus the remainder of the analysis on the first four waves of the panel (see Table 3 of the appendix for more details on the sample selection).
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In the literature, educational mismatch is measured as the difference between workers' actual education and required education for their job. Three methods are generally used for defining required education, each of them presenting arguments for and against (see, e.g., Hartog, 2000; Chevalier, 2003 , for critical overviews of each measurement method). The first measure is obtained from the job analysis method; according to this objective method, the level of education required to perform a particular job is determined by a systematic job evaluation. However, this information is actually unavailable for Switzerland. Second, some surveys include the worker's self-assessment of educational requirement; this subjective method consists in asking workers directly how much education is required to get or do their job. But the SHP survey does not provide such information. As a result, we are left with the realized matches method that can always be implemented. There are two main measures derived from this objective and statistical method. First, the required education is defined as a band around the mean level of education within each occupation (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989) . Workers are then overeducated (resp. undereducated) if their actual education expressed in years diverges by more than one standard deviation above (resp. below) the mean value for a given occupation. The required education can also be established from the modal rather than the mean level of education (Kiker et al., 1997) . Accordingly, workers are overeducated (resp. undereducated) if their educational attainment falls above (resp. below) the modal value for a specific occupation.
As noted by Kiker et al. (1997) and Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000) , the standard deviation procedure has the disadvantage, with respect to the modal measure, that it is more sensitive to the presence of outliers in the data. In addition, it relies on the strong assumption of symmetry, while the modal level of education within a particular occupation better reflects the potential asymmetry of the distribution. Therefore, we derive required education from the mode of workers' actual educational attainment in each occupation, separately by survey year. The highest level of education achieved consists of 10 levels classified in an increasing hierarchical order; each educational level is translated into the total number of years of schooling (see Table 4 of the appendix). Moreover, we rely on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) disaggregated on a 2-digit level with at least 10 observations in a year; 4 this amounts to about thirty occupation levels. As we show in Section 5, the main findings of the empirical analysis do not change depending on whether we use (i) occupations disaggregated on a 3-digit level or (ii) another conversion scale between levels and years of education.
3 Educational mismatch and wages Duncan and Hoffman (1981) have proposed an extended version of the Mincer wage equation in which years of actual education S a are decomposed into years of required education S r , years of overeducation S o and years of undereducation S u :
where w it is the gross hourly wage for individual i at wave t, 5 δ a constant term, X it potential years of work experience (= year of interview -year started working without prolonged interruption) and G i a dummy variable for gender (= 1 if worker is a woman). While S r it is simply derived from the realised matches method, the following identities hold for S o it and S u it :
By construction, S a = S r + S o − S u . Adequately educated workers earn a return of α r for years of required education. Overeduated workers receive a return of α r for years of required education plus a return of α o for years of surplus education. And undereducated workers get a return of α r for years of required education minus a return of α u for years of deficit education.
Two theoretical frameworks can be tested on the basis of Duncan and Hoffman's wage equation. First, the human capital hypothesis (Becker, 1964) implies this joint equality: α r = α o = −α u . Accordingly, wages only depend on worker's characteristics and the Duncan and Hoffman specification simplifies to the Mincer wage equation. Second, the job competition hypothesis (Thurow, 1975) states that wages are entirely determined by required education: α o = α u = 0. In this case, workers' characteristics do not matter in the wage determination process. Most earlier studies do not give support to these hypotheses (for the latest surveys of the empirical evidence using the Duncan and Hoffman specification, see McGuinness, 2006; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011) , in particular: (1) returns to overeducation are positive and lower than returns to required education, i.e.
returns to undereducation are negative and lower than returns to required education in absolute value, i.e. α u < 0 and α r > |α u |. Compared to those adequately educated, overeducated (resp. undereducated) workers earn less (resp. more) for a given level of actual education but earn more (resp. less) for a given level of occupation. As most prior researches have relied on a cross-sectional estimation of Duncan and Hoffman's specification and have then assumed that unobserved heterogeneity (including ability, motivation and other unobserved characteristics) is uncorrelated with educational mismatch, they are confronted with the problem of omitted variable bias if this assumption fails to hold. Indeed, the omission of unobserved heterogeneity may lead to an underestimation of the rate of return to overeducation if unobserved heterogeneity is negatively correlated with overeducation; conversely, the rate of return to undereducation is probably overestimated in case of a positive correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and undereducation. Few studies have controlled for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating Duncan and Hoffman's wage equation. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel data from 1984 to 1998, Bauer (2002) has applied the fixed effects method. He has indicated that unobserved heterogeneity explains a large part of the difference between returns to required education and over/undereducation: in particular, the estimated differences become smaller for men and totally disappear for women. On the basis of the same estimation method, very different results are reported by Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) using data from Swedish Level of Living surveys from 1974, 1981, 1991 and 2000 . They have found that returns to over/undereducation remain smaller in absolute value than the return to required education after controlling for fixed unobserved heterogeneity.
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In a fixed effects analysis, unobserved heterogeneity c i becomes part of the disturbance term: it = c i + u it , where u it is the independent, identically distributed error. The fixed effects method is attractive because it allows for c i to be arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory variables. Indeed, its main assumption is strict exogeneity of the covariates conditional on c i :
.., T , where x it is the vector of regressors. However, the fixed effects method does not allow the estimation of time-invariant variables and can lead to imprecise estimates if the key variables in x it do not vary much over time (cf Wooldridge, 2002) . As noted by Nielsen (2007) , a fixed effects approach would only identify the returns to educational mismatch from information on individuals who change their level of education within the sample period. In fact, recall that
In case S a is constant across time, the within-individual variation in S r , S o and S u is characterized by perfect multicollinearity. Even with little longi-tudinal variation in S a , the fixed effects estimation remains problematic. As the fixed effects estimator only makes use of the within-individual variation in the sample, this leads to inefficient estimates of the returns to over-, required and undereducation. According to Plümper and Troeger (2007) , the inefficiency of the fixed effects model results from the fact that it disregards the between variation and, thus, does not take all the available information into account. While Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) do not present any information about between and within variations of actual education, Bauer (2002) displays this information. As expected, variation across individuals is much larger than variation within individuals: the ratio of the between standard deviation of actual education to the within standard deviation of the same variable is ranging between 7.35 (for women) and 8.68 (for men). The high values of this ratio cast doubt on whether the fixed effects estimates of the returns to educational mismatch could be identified. Actual education is time-constant in our sample since we exclude individuals enrolled in education (i.e. S a it = S a i for all t). How can we reconcile the variation need of the fixed effects estimator and the time-invariant nature of actual education? In order to address the aforementioned problem of identification, we use a simplified version of Duncan and Hoffman's model proposed by Rumberger (1987) in which years of overeducation and years of undereducation are restricted to have a symmetric effects on wages (i.e. α u = −α o ):
The use of this specification is motivated by the two latest meta-analyses of studies estimating Duncan and Hoffman's model (Rubb, 2003; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011) ; they have demonstrated that the returns associated with overeducation and undereducation are in nature close to symmetry. Rubb's main message about the average returns to over-, required, undereducation computed on the basis of 85 wage estimates is stated as follows (p. 621):
7 "on average, the literature finds that the premium paid for overeducation is approximately equal to the penalty for undereducation, but lower than the returns associated with an increase in required education." Based on approximately 150 studies, 8 Leuven and Oosterbeek's descriptive results reinforce
Rubb's statement (p. 30): "the return to a year of required schooling is around 0.09, to a year of overschooling more or less half of that, and a year of underschooling results in a wage penalty of again around half of the return to a required year of schooling." It should be noted that the findings of Rubb (2003) and Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) are probably biased since most studies included in their meta-analyses have neglected unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the Duncan and Hoffman specification. Nevertheless, the hypothesis of symmetric returns to overeducation and undereducation is crucial for our identification strategy, given that the use of Rumberger's wage equation allows the fixed effects estimator to exploit the within-individual variation in required education. We can rearrange Rumberger's wage equation as
where ∆α corresponds to the differential rate of return between required education and educational mismatch. The identification of this coefficient is possible with fixed effects since S r varies over time. • Random Effects While this model allows coefficients on time-constant explanatory variables to be identified, its main shortcoming is the strong assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is independent from covariates. As with pooled ordinary least squares, the random effects regression model includes all the time-invariant and time-varying covariates, and three dummies for the second, third and fourth waves.
• Fixed Effects This model is more appropriate to estimate the wage effects of educational mismatch since it allows for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and covariates; but estimation of time-invariant explanatory variables is not possible as the fixed effects estimator needs individuals' variation over time. Thus, only the time-varying controls are considered (i.e. required education, potential work experience and potential work experience squared).
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All the explanatory variables are presented in Table 5 , while descriptive sample statistics are presented in Table 6 (see the appendix). Since identification in fixed effects analysis relies on within-individual variation, sufficient variation in S r within workers is needed in order to obtain precise estimates.
Between and within standard deviations are displayed in Table 6 . Even if most of the variance in the modal measure of S r is due to differences across workers, there is also substantial variance within workers. In fact, the within standard deviation is close to 50 percent of the between standard deviation. Hence, our identification strategy based on sufficient variations in S r appears valid.
Results
Regression results from equation 1 are displayed in Table 1 ; pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimates are presented in the first, second and third columns, respectively. POLS results show that the differential rate of return between required education and educational mismatch (α r − α o ) and the return to educational mismatch (α o ) are both of them significantly positive: workers earn a return of 0.073 (= 0.017 + 0.056) for a year of required education and a positive return of 0.056 for a year of surplus education (i.e. a negative return of -0.056 for a year of deficit education). Hence, these estimates are fully consistent with most earlier studies according to which the human capital and job competition hypotheses are rejected, given that the return to overeducation is Table 7 of the appendix.
positive and lower than the return to required education, i.e. α r − α o > 0 and α o > 0.
The rejection of the Hausman test implies that the RE model is inconsistent for estimating the wages returns to educational mismatch since unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with covariates. Therefore, we focus our attention on the FE estimates. This method indicates that the differential rate of return between required education and educational mismatch is no more significant, i.e. α r − α o = 0. Moreover, this result emphasizes that there is no evidence against the human capital hypothesis. Consequently, omitted variable bias seems to explain the entire difference between returns to required education and educational mismatch. Given that our fixed effects estimates are based on an unbalanced panel data set, it is important to determine if sample selection due to attrition is present. As our longitudinal sample is set up in a way such that attrition is an absorbing state, one way to test for attrition bias is to add a lead of selection indicator (s i,t+1 )
10 as an additional regressor in the fixed effects analysis and test for significance using a t test (Wooldridge, 2002) . The result of this procedure (presented at the bottom of Table 1) show that the lead variable is not significant (t statistic corresponds to -0.80), meaning there is no evidence of attrition bias. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that sample selection is not an issue in our fixed effects regression.
Robustness checks
In this section, we wonder whether our findings rest on the specific measure of required education that we adopt when estimating equation 1. Recall that required education is measured with the mode procedure, on the basis of the CNEF conversion scale between levels and years of education (cf Table 4 ) and occupations disaggregated on a 2-digit level.
The most obvious alternative is the measure derived from the mean procedure. Accordingly, required education corresponds to the mean value of workers' educational attainment for their occupation. However, in order to satisfy S a = S r + S o − S u , required education needs to be equal to workers' actual education for those adequately educated (i.e. in case their actual education is within plus or minus one standard deviation of the mean education for their occupation) given that S o = 0 and S u = 0. The between and within standard deviations for this variable are reported in the last row of Table 6 (see the appendix). The identification of the parameter of interest (α r − α o ) should not be an issue since the mean-based measure of required education shows some variation across time: its within standard deviation represents 1/3 of its between standard deviation. All the estimates of Table 1 are re-derived in Table 2 by replacing the mode-based measure of required education by the mean-based measure in equation 1. The results are qualitatively similar and thus confirm our main conclusion: returns to required education and educational mismatch become equal after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Additional robustness checks consist in assessing the sensitivity of the estimates when we consider for the measurement of required education either a more detailed classification of occupations (i.e. disaggregated on a 3-digit level) or an alternative conversion scale between levels and years of education. For instance, Weber (2010) have proposed a conversion scale according to which an individual needs to spent 13 years (instead of 12 years) to get a high school degree while a certificate from a technical or vocational school is obtained after 14 years (instead of 15 years). We re-estimate equation 1 in which the mode-or mean-based measures of required education are computed using this alternative conversion scale or the 3-digit ISCO code. The estimation results are presented from Table 9 to Table 11 (see the appendix). All the fixed effects estimates of the differential rate of return between required education and educational mismatch remain statistically indifferent from zero. They are again qualitatively similar to previous estimates, indi-cating that our results are robust to various ways of deriving the statistical measure of required education.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to solve the problem of omitted heterogeneity bias when estimating the wage returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation. We have used data from the Swiss Household Panel whose longitudinal aspect allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity by means of fixed effects. While a few studies have also applied this method (Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009) , they have neglected the fact that sufficient variations in actual education within workers are needed to identify the returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation. This paper distinguishes from these studies since our identification strategy exploits the within-individual variation in required education instead. After rearranging the wage equation proposed by Rumberger (1987) that implicitly recognizes a symmetric relationship between overeducation and undereducation, the parameter of interest is indeed associated with required education: it measures the differential rate of return between required education and educational mismatch.
Based on the strong assumption that educational mismatch is uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity, estimating the wage returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation by pooled ordinary least squares produces results in line with the literature: the return to overeducation is positive and lower than the return to required education. In other words, overeducated workers earn more than their adequately educated coworkers but less than those adequately educated with the same level of education. The reverse reasoning applies to undereducated workers, since years of overeducation and years of undereducation are supposed to have symmetric effects on wages. However, the fixed effects results show that pooled ordinary least squares method is consistent with omitted heterogeneity bias. Indeed, once the sources of time constant unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for, the wage returns associated with overeducation and undereducation are downward and upward biased, respectively, in pooled ordinary least squares.
Returns to required education, overeducation and undereducation are then equally rewarded as human capital hypothesis suggests. This interpretation of the Swiss labour market is consistent with the observed fact that Switzerland has a flexible labour market keeping the rate of human resource utilization high (OECD, 2000) .
Two possible further modifications of this paper would be as follows. First, we have assumed that the required education variable was strictly exogenous conditional on unobserved heterogeneity; however if this variable is correlated with the i.i.d. error in some time period, fixed effects are inconsistent and may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, one possibility for improvement would be to apply first differencing and find convincing instruments for required education, the latter of which is far from simple. Second, the estimated specification hinges on the assumption that the returns to overeducation and undereducation are symmetrical. Even if the latest metaanalyses of studies on educational mismatch have agreed with this statement, it would be worth testing the robustness of our findings on the basis of a more flexible relationship between overeducation and undereducation. 
